- README.md: overview, hardware, build/flash, usage, web API, exports - SECURITY.md: passive-receiver scope + vulnerability disclosure - SIGNATURES.md: signature provenance and upstream credit - .gitignore: block GPS-tagged detection exports from being committed Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
30 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
30 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
# Signature Provenance
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Dantir detects devices by matching publicly broadcast radio signatures —
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Bluetooth MAC OUI prefixes, advertised device-name patterns, BLE manufacturer
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company IDs, service UUIDs, and WiFi management-frame source OUIs. None of this
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data is proprietary; it comes from public registries and open community
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research.
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## Sources & credit
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- **[OUI Spy Unified Blue](https://github.com/colonelpanichacks/oui-spy-unified-blue)**
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by **colonelpanichacks** ([colonelpanic.tech](https://colonelpanic.tech/)) —
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the upstream project Dantir is forked from, and the origin of the core
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detection engine and much of the BLE signature set.
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- **[flock-you](https://github.com/wgreenberg/flock-you)** by **wgreenberg** —
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BLE detection research on Flock Safety hardware.
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- **[deflock.me](https://deflock.me/)** — community-maintained, crowd-sourced
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catalog of surveillance-device signatures (ALPR cameras and related gear).
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- **IEEE MA-L (OUI) registry** — public assignments mapping MAC prefixes to
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manufacturers.
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- **Bluetooth SIG company identifiers** — manufacturer company IDs carried in
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BLE advertisements, published by the Bluetooth SIG.
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## Nature of the data
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These signatures describe what publicly observable radio emissions *look like* —
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facts about how devices identify themselves over the air, compiled for
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interoperability and security-research purposes. A detection indicates only
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that a matching broadcast was observed nearby. It is **not** proof of the
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presence, ownership, or operation of any specific device or party.
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